Galenson estimated physical Output per wage earner for sixteen industries. Where possible, he adjusted for differences in quality and product mix. He showed 1936 Soviel productivity in these industries to have been between 58 per cent of the US for tractors and 15 per cent for heavy construction machinery.' Both unweighted and weighted by Soviet employment, his average Soviet productivity estimate for these 16 branches in the late 1930s was 40 per cent of the US level. ' Schroeder estimated Soviet physical Output per production worker relative to the USA for 1956 for 25 branches of industry and compared her results with the figures obtained by the Soviet economist Kats, who based his estimates on roughly the same branches.' After making a few adjustments for differences in quality'" and product mix between the two countries, her average ratio (29.5 per cent) was considerably below that of Kats (47.9 per cent). The difference between her results and Kats' could not be explained because she could not replicate most of his estimates. Nevertheless, Schroeder used Kats' implicit employment estimates for 14 of her 25 branches.
In contrast to the three authors mentioned above, Nutter used both quantity and value data." To convert Output valued in rubles and dollars to a common currency, he used what he called 'ruble-dollar ratios'. These ruble-dollar ratios were derived for 45 sample industries firom his value added series.'^ For each of his 45 industries, US value added in dollars was multiplied by the ratio of Soviet to US physical Output to arrive at Soviet value added in dollars:
(1) VA'/'^andVA';'"^ stands for US and USSR value added in industiyj valued in US dollars, ß^-andßf" stands for US and Soviet quantities in industry j.
Similarly, Soviet value added was multiplied by the ratio of US to Soviet physical Output to arrive at US value added in rubles (R):
(2) = Combining and rewriting (1) and (2) gives either: which, in formula form, is identical to (5), in section 4 below, for an individual product, or:
which, in formula form, is identical to (6), in section 4 below, for an individual product. It needs to be reminded thought that in section 4 prices are value added based, while Nutter's prices are quantity based. This means that Nutter's method of deriving a conversion factor for an industry comes dose to the ICOP method for deriving a unit value ratio (or purchasing power parity) for each individual product which I used. However, he did not differentiate his analysis by product but derived his ratios by industry (e.g. paper). My (ICOP) procedure is to measure Output of products (e.g. pulp, bleached pulp, unbleached sulphite pulp, newsprint, offset paper, bond and writing paper, unbleached kraft paper, and paper board) whereas Nutter used a single indicator (paper) for each industry. In fact Nutter was more interested in time series than in level estimates. The latter covered 45 products and were done more crudely than his series for 119 products. Nutter made no adjustments for quality differences. A serious weakness in his method is that his sample did not include machinery and equipment industries." He alleviated this problem by using ruble-dollar ratios for these industries, as estimated by Becker." Nutter aggregated the ruble-dollar ratios for his 45 industries by using value added weights. This result was averaged with the ruble-dollar ratios for machinery as derived from Becker using persons engaged as weights." Nutter's benchmark estimates of levels were intended mainly to check the results of his time series. For the benchmark years (1913, 1928, and 1955 ) he compared value added per man-hour engaged in industry. He defined industry in the Soviet way, i.e. including manufacturing, mining, logging, fishing, and power supply. Industrial value added was calculated as 'the sum of employee compensation, profits, and net 'commerciaV and mallocated outlays, all of which are rather indirectly derived'.^'' Nutter concluded that the level of Soviet value added per hour worked in 1955 was a little over 19 per cent of the USA. For the same year, I estimate Soviet value added per hour worked in industry as a litüe under 22 per cent of die US level.
Under supervision of Valentin Kudrov, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences conducted a detailed comparison of Soviet and US economic Performance." In that study, productivity was defined as gross Output per production worker. IMEMO's conversion method was based on comparing quantities of individual products valued at both Soviet and US prices. These parities were used to convert gross Output to a common currency. IMEMO's aggregate result showed that 1963 Soviet productivity in industry was about 35 per cent of the USA. As in Nutter's study, industry was defined according to the Soviet Classification. The IMEMO study was not published as it was considered by the authorities to give an unfavourable view of Soviet Performance." Another reason for differences in results is that my estimates for the benchmark year 1987 are based on Soviet statistics that were not previously available to researchers outside the Soviet bureaucracy. Most of the earlier studies had to rely on official published statistics from miscellaneous sources." Nutter, for instance, relied mainly on officially published material (e.g. Narodnoe Khozyaistvo, Promyshlennost' SSSR) and a very wide ränge of specialised books and articles (his Soviet references included over 6(X) entries). Galenson used official sources too, supplemented by reports and articles by technical experts. My estimates are based on detailed, unpublished product and industry Information provided by CIS-STAT.^ The sources are described in detail in appendix A.2. They were available to me in handwritten form and obtained directiy from the enterprise files in the CIS-STAT archives. Even though I had access to these files, this does not necessarily mean the results are more reliable of course, but I could check the detail of the estimates to great extend. However, there are still serious limitations on the exercise as the füll detail of the industrial census is still confidential. 
III. Comparing Soviet and US Industrial Output and Labour Productivity
The present study estimates the Performance of Soviet industry relative to the world productivity leader, i.e. the USA. Comparative studies of Output and productivity levels which Cover communist command economies raise a ränge of specific problems which are less important or do not exist for comparisons between market economies. These can be summarised as follows^: a) Official prices are not determined by market forces but by administrative processes." This makes comparing Output between market and non-market economies more difficult.^ Comparisons at world prices face substantial problems too, because the quality of exported commodities often deviates strongly from items sold domestically.^ Marer also notes a Sharp dichotomy between Soviet domestic prices and prices in international transactions." b) The average quality of products in communist countries was generally lower than in Westem economies." However, it has not been documented whether such differences were equally large across the whole ränge of industry products, including non-durable consumer goods as well as intermediate goods and investment goods. Furthermore, given the administrative nature of the pricing system in the Soviet Union, one cannot be sure to what extent quality differences were not reflected in the prices of the products. For lack of Information 1 made no quality adjustments in the present study. The only author from table 2 who did so for the Soviet Union was Schroeder.'' It should be emphasised that part of the 'unmeasured' difference in product quality between the USSR and USA is implicitly accounted for in this study by putting my comparison on a value added basis rather than on a gross Output basis. The higher ratio of intermediate inputs to gross Output, described above, is partly the result of greater wastage, but it also reflects the low technology content of the products which is compensated for by a more intensive use of intermediate inputs. The latter aspect can be interpreted as an indication of low product quality in the Soviet Union. '' c) It is difficult to reconcile the industry classifications of the United States and the Soviet Union. Most market type economies have a Classification which is similar to the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC)'^, which makes international comparisons between those economies fairly straightforward. The Soviet Classification differs markedly from ISIC.
Soviet 'industry' according to OKONKh ('Obshchesoyuznyi Klassifikator Otrasli Narodnovo Khozyaistva', literally: an all-union branch Classification for the national economy) consists of manufacturing activities, mining, electrical power supply, fishing, and repair and maintenance activities. The US Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) distinguishes most of these activities as separate divisions. For this study I adjusted the Soviet Classification in such a way as to make it comparable to the Classification of the United States. Adjusting Soviet 'industry' to 'manufacturing' not only made it necessary to exclude all non-manufacturing activities (e.g. 'mining of raw materials for chemicals' had to be excluded fi-om the chemical branch), but also to reclassify several Soviet industries (e.g. Soviet 'light Industries' were reclassified to 'textiles', 'wearing apparel', and 'leather and footwear')." In this article, I focus mainly on manufacturing (section V), but also present results for mining (section VI), and for industry as a whole (section VII My Impression is that at least a substantial part of military production is included in my sources, because aircraft production, defence industries, and shipbuilding are included in the OKONKh Classification. Although for these industries no detailed Information was available, the Output and employment can be inferred from the total of the machinery branch by comparing the identified civilian components of the industry with the total." At CIS-STAT is was explained to me that some parts of the military output were more secret than others. The production of so-called 'closed ministries' was reported to Goskomstat USSR only in a very aggregated form. At CIST-STAT it was not known whether military production and employment were completely covered in Goskomstat USSR statistics.
e) An important characteristic of the economic system of communist countries is that only 'material' production was considered to be productive.^' Therefore Soviet statistics generally ignore 'non-productive' Service sector activities in national accounts and national income calculations. This causes considerable difficulties in estimating manufacturing value added on a basis comparable to Western definitions."
IV. Methodology, Benchmark Year, and Coverage

Methodolog/^
To convert Soviet output in rubles to dollars, and American output in dollars to rubles, I calculated unit value ratios (UVRs)" which are based on ratios of ex-factory sales values per unit of Output for as many industrial products as could be matched between the Soviet Union and the United States."" Using the value and quantity information from the respective censuses, I calculated implicit prices (unit values) in rubles and in dollars. product, I divided the value in Soviel prices by the Soviel quantity times the relevant US Unit value. I derived unit value ratios between the two countries by dividing the individual ruble unit value by the corresponding dollar unit value. Individual product UVRs (e.g. milk or butter) were aggregated to the industry level (e.g. dairy products) using quantity weights of either the Soviet Union or the United States. This results in:
UVRj is the unit value ratio in industry j, i=l...s is the sample of matched items i in matched industry j, g,""' is Soviet quantity of product i in industiy j, P is unit value.
at quantity weights of the Soviet Union (or Paasche UVR), and:
at quantity weights of the USA (or Laspeyres UVR). The second stage of aggregation from industry to branch level (e.g. food) was made by weighting the unit value ratios as derived above, by value added in each industry in the Soviet Union or the USA, i.e.: (7)
UVR, = / UVRj] M UVR,^ is unit value ratio in branch k, UVRjis the unit value ratio for gross Output of industry j, j=l..,r are the industries j in branch k.
for the Paasche UVR of branch k at Soviet weights, and:
j^fUVRj * VATI
• -for the Laspeyres UVR of branch k at US weights. Finally, the branch UVRs were aggregated to a total for manufacturing using branch value added weights. I used the Fisher average to summarise the two resulting ratios. The UVRs for gross Output were assumed to be valid for value added (gross Output minus intermediate inputs) which implies that the UVR's for gross Output were assumed also to be representative for intermediate inputs.
Benchmark Year
The year 1987 was chosen as benchmark mainly for practical reasons. For this year a US census of manufactures and mining was available, and CIS-STAT could supply detailed Soviet product and industry data. Also, for this year, for both the USA and the USSR a detailed input-output table was available.
1987 was one of the last years in which the Soviet command economy functioned more or less in füll shape. CIS-STAT claims that this was the last year in which their reporting system had a complete coverage of enterprises.
Coverage
This study Covers 16 branches of manufacturing, using 132 product matches for manufacturing, and 6 product matches for minlng. Table 4 shows the coverage of my sample by branch. The 132 manufacturing items cover 18.5 per cent of Soviet gross value of output and 16.3 per cent of US Output. The matched shares differ substantially both between branches and between the two countries. For a branch with relatively many homogeneous products, like tobacco, the matched items cover a large part of total output, but this is not so in branches with many diversified products, such as textiles or machinery, where it was more difficult to attain a high proportion of matched items. There are three possible ways to assess the adequacy of coverage: (1) the share of matched Output in total manufacturing output; (2) the total number of product matches"; and (3) the ratio of matched to gross output in the machinery and equipment branch. The latter branch is very large and contains a wide ränge of heterogeneous products. It is not easily represented by a small number of product matches. Tables 4 and 5 show gross Output, value added and productivity in national currencies, and the number of persons engaged and hours worked in Soviet and American manufacturing in 1987 as derived from census material. When expressed at its own prices, 'machinery and transport equipment' was clearly the biggest branch in both countries, both in terms of Output and employment. Productivity in Soviet machinery was below that of total manufacturing, while in the US its productivity was slightly above average. The relative Standing of the textiles, apparel and leather branches was better in the USSR than in the USA. In the Soviet Union these combined branches had a productivity level of 72 per cent of that for total manufacturing; in the US this relative Standing was lower, at 52 per cent. Graphs 2 and 3 show the distribution of value added for the same 16 branches. The value added in each graph is weighted at both Soviet and US prices. Value added is calculated on the basis of the definitions as described in appendix A, unit value ratios as Converters for the branches are obtained from table 3. It is clear that Soviet manufacturing was far more heavily concentrated in the machinery and transport equipment branch than was US manufacturing. The graphs also illustrate the differences in outcome when weighted at Soviet or US prices. Soviet food, metals and machinery branches together accounted for more than 50 per cent of total Output and employment compared with about 40 per cent in the USA. Textiles, wearing apparel and leather contributed more than 15 per cent of Soviet Output and less than 5 per cent in the USA. The biggest ouüier was 'other manufacturing' which had a much larger share in the United States. The higher degree of detail in the US statistics made it easier to decide that a particular industry belongs to 'other manufacturing', while in the Soviel Union such a distinction was not always feasible. Soviel gross level of outpul in manufacturing was Utile over 60 per cent of the US. This is in Sharp contrast with the relative size of employmenl: Soviel manufacturing employed more Ihan 1.7 times as many persons as did the US. The leather branch had an exceptionally high level of gross outpul relative to the USA (112 per cent). This is not really surprising since leather and für producls, bolh included in this branch, are far more populär in Russia than in the USA. The non-metallic mineral producls branch is anolher with a high gross outpul ratio relative to the USA (151 per cent). This is mainly due to the high produclion level of conslruction malerials in the Soviel Union. The Soviel value of produclion of construclion malerials (excluding glass) in rubles was higher than the produclion of stone, clay and glass producls together in the US valued in dollars. The machinery and transport equipment branch was very imporlanl in bolh the US and the Soviel Union. An explanalion for this difference in size is difficull to give since detailed outpul information for Soviel mililary industries, which accounls for a substantial pari of this branch, is not available. But, the Soviel machinery seclor focused more heavily than the USA on producing non-electrical machinery. Compared to the USA the USSR concentrated less on producing consumer eleclronics, which are pari of the electronic machinery branch.
V. Manufacturing
On average 68 per cent of Soviel gross Output, valued in rubles, was used as intermediate inputs in other industrial activities. Compared to other communist economies which have been sludied in the ICOP projecl we see that in 1989 Czechoslovakia's share of material inputs in Output was 73 per cent. For Easl Germany this was 66 per cent in 1987." Compared to US and West German shares of 53 and 58 per cent respectively this clearly confirms the general tendency of communist command economies to show a greater inpul inlensily than market economies. The ratio of Soviel to US value added (43 per cent) was considerably lower than that for gross Output (61 per cent). The Soviel tendency to high intermediate inpul use was strengest in the lighl industry branch: food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, apparel and leather.
As explained in appendix A, value added is our preferred concept of outpul. Graph 4 shows relative labour productivity levels on the basis of value added per person engaged, and per hour worked. Soviel relative level of value added per employee for total manufacturing was 25 per cent of the USA. The level for value added per hour worked in the USSR relative to the USA was 26 per cenl. Distribution over the branches is fairly uneven. Soviel relative labour productivity was highesl in the metal and machinery branches, and lowest in the beverage industries. Striking is the low productivity in the chemical branches, and in eleclrical machinery and equipment. The relative high level of productivity in the machinery branch needs to be interpreted with caution since the reliabilily of its unit value ratio is questionable." 
VI. Mining
For comparing Soviet and US mining the same issues apply as for manufacturing, i.e. the differences between market and non-market economies regarding prices, quality, Classification, and concepts. Table 6 shows comparative levels of Output, value added, employment, average annual hours worked and productivity in mining. It is clear that Soviet productivity in mining relative to the US was almost twice as high as in manufacturing. One possible explanation could be the richness of Soviet natural resources, which made it possible to concentrate on easily accessible sources, and benefit from economies of scale.
Mining is an activity with a particularly great impact on the environment. Recent discoveries of extensive pollution in the Soviet Union give some clue of how 'dirty' Soviet mining was. This clearly could have had its influence on productivity. About 48 per cent of both Soviel and US mining Output at national prices was produced in the oil and gas extracting industry. Other important mining industries were: coal, iron ore, and mining of chemical raw material. Table 6 shows value added per employee for the three mining industries for which product matches could be made. Crude petroleum and natural gas were clearly the most productive, with a productivity over 50 per cent higher than in the USA. This industry dominates the results for mining as a whole. The oil and gas extraction industry is the biggest sector, and had the highest relative Soviet productivity.
VII. Industry as a Whole
Hitherto, this article has focused on a comparison of manufacturing and mining Performance. Before merging the cross-section findings for the benchmark year 1987 with the available time series, it is necessary to round off the 1987 estimates to cover industry as a whole. In order to ensure consistency with US defmitions we took account only of Soviet electricity and fibre processing. I excluded fishing and industrial repair and maintenance as these are not considered to be industrial activities in the USA, and are excluded from the CIA time series. Table 7 shows the comparative results for Soviet and US industry and Üie three components: manufacturing, mining, and electricity and fibre processing. For manufacturing and mining I made detailed estimates of UVRs to convert figures to dollars. For the rest group, I simply used a weighted average of the UVRs for manufacturing and mining.
A Crosscheck on my Results for Industry as a Whole
As a crosscheck on my ICOP approach, I made a sensitivity test by replicating Schroeder's physical quantity method (see section II)," and applying it to my data set for 1987. This provides a test to see the differences in results between the physical quantity method compared to my value added method. I was able to replicate the Schroeder method for 15 of her 25 industries for 1987 (see table 8 ). Average physical Output per employee was derived using both Soviet and US employment weights. Value added per employee was averaged over the industries using value added weights. For these industries Soviet productivity was on average higher relative to the USA using her physical quantity method than my value added method, but there was substantial Variation across industries. Soviet physical Output per employee for the 15 industries averaged 33 per cent of the USA (using both Soviet and US employment weights), whereas the ICOP value added method showed average Soviet productivity to be 23 per cent of the USA. Converter) . These were derived as described in the text. 
Remco Kouwenhoven
VIII. Merging of the 1987 Benchmark Estimates with Time Series for 1928-90
To get a view on the dynamics of comparative productivity, I merged time series for both countries with my benchmark estimates for 1987.
Soviet time series
Extensive work on Soviet value added time series from 1950 onwards has been carried out by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The results of this work were published in studies of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress." These were mainly based on physical Output indicators with value added weights at 1982 factor prices, though a proportion of the estimates was derived from official deflated value series. The CIA provided an update of two JEC studies."' I rebased these time series on my 1987 benchmark at 1987 prices. The CIA estimates are based on the official Soviet Classification, and I had to re- These series are valued at factor cost and in 1982 rubles. The first adjustment excludes the extraction of energy sources such as oil, and coal. Due to differences in detail between both available CIA series, first all fuel (CIA series processed March 15, 1991b) was deducted from the industry series and then oil refinery series were added back in (CIA, 1991a). Next electric power was deducted from the series (CIA, 1991b). Mining activities of the ferrous metals branch were deducted aswell (CIA, 1991a), as were logging activities (CIA, 1991a), and machinery repair activities (CIA, 1991a On average, Soviet labour productivity relative to the US seems to have deteriorated ever since the late 1920's. Viewing over the whole period it seems as if not much has changed (31.6 per cent in 1928, 27.5 per cent in 1990). However, starting at about a third of US productivity in 1929, the relative standing of Soviet productivity drops sharply in the years just before the second world war. These pre-war figures need to be taken with some reserve however, since especially the quality of Soviet figures for this period could not be checked. 
IX. Firm Size
So far this article has concentrated on estimating output and productivity in the Soviel Union reative to the United States. Nothing has been said to explain the differences we found. Here I take a first step in the direction of an analysis of these differences by looking at firm size. In her 1985 study Eva Ehrlich investigated the size structure of establishments and enterprises" in both capitalist and socialist countries." She concluded that the size of establishments was considerably larger in socialist countries than in capitalist countries. For this fact she suggested several explanations."
(1) In the socialist political system, private ownership was liquidated and small-scale craft industries were suppressed.
(2) Because Soviet-type industrialisation aimed at rapid economic development and elimination of unemployment, masses of new industrial Jobs were created. Planners gave priority to iron and steel and investment goods which usually involve large enterprises.
(3) Socialist economies tried to economise on the use of intellectual labour by creating large enterprises with one centralised management.
(4) A system of central planning cannot function in an environment of small-scale, autonomous units. The command economies were easier to handle if they consisted of relatively few, large scale enterprises.
In table 13 below, one can see that Ehrlich's general conclusions about firm size in socialist economies also applied to the Soviet Union in 1987. In the USSR almost three-quarters of the persons engaged worked in enterprises with more than one thousand employees. In the USA the same share of employees worked in establishments with less than one thousand employees. More than 90 per cent of US establishments had less than 100 employees, while this was true for less than 30 per cent of Soviet enterprises. In die last line of the table one can see that the average number of employees in a Soviet enterprise was 814, and 50 in an average US establishment.
The above conclusions have to be drawn with some care. It remains unclear whether Soviet data in table 13 includes all enterprises, or only State owned enterprises. In the US some enterprises e.g. General Motors have several hundred establishments and there are a very large number of firms with more than one plant. For this reason we are endeavouring to find out how many enterprises there were in the US in 1987. From the Japanese Establishment Census we know for instance that in 1991 Japan had 857,016 establishments, and 337,578 enterprises (a ratio of 2.54)". The number of Soviet units would certainly be increased if we had been able to use establishment rather than enterprise data. Lenin's priorities left their mark on the Soviet economy even more than 60 years after his death. Soviet industry was heavily concentrated in heavy industry. In 1987, more than two thirds of Soviet industrial value added was produced in iron and steel, and machinery when valued at US prices, and nearly half at Soviet prices. The economic activities of Soviet industry were concentrated in huge enterprises because this facilitated central conunand, and was thought to lead to economies of scale. Lenin's goal of overtaking the US economy was never achieved.
Rtmco Kouwenhoven
This study has benefited from co-operation with experts in both Russia and the USA. However, several important questions remain unanswered. Firsüy, due to differences in Statistical concepts between the two countries (MPS versus SNA), it is likely that the differing value added concepts lead to some Understatement of relative Soviet productivity levels. Secondly, allthough I received great help from the Russian authorities in access to data, there are still some serious limitations on the quality of the exercise as the füll detail of the industrial census is still confidential. 
Gross Output Concept
The Soviet notion of gross value of Output used in this study is the 'tovarnaya produktsiya v optovykh tsenakh predpriyatnii' (literally: commodity Output in enterprise wholesale prices). Its definition can be found in the methodological explanations of the Statistical yearbook 'Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR' (literally: 'National Economy of the USSR'): Gross output of industry is defined as the sum of data related to the output of individual industrial enterprises valued by the industrial method (i.e. in wholesale prices of enterprises). The value of gross Output is the value of all goods produced by reporting enterprises during the record period including semi-manufactured goods sold to other entities (including own raw materials as well as customer's supplies and materials) and the value of production services for other enterprises or non-industrial divisions of the own enterprise. Gross Output excludes (with some exceptions) the value of goods produced for own consumption in the production process." Soviet Output is valued at wholesale prices of enterprises ('v optovykh tsenakh predipriyatnii'). These prices cover average cost plus a mark-up for profit." Producer prices normally exclude turnover taxes. However, some turnover taxes are levied on Soviet inter-industry sales, with a great Variation between branches. Correcting for this was not possible because of lack of Information. US sales, from the 1987 US Census of Manufactures, are valued f.o.b. plant, after discounts and allowances and excluding freight charges and excise taxes.
Shipments vs Output
The 1987 US Census of Manufactures provides Information on sales of products and industrial services rendered valued at producer prices; this Information refers to the 'value of shipments'. In the USSR, by contrast, the Information referred to output produced. The difference between US and Soviet concepts lies in the treatment of stocks. In the US census sales include the net change in stocks. Soviet output includes all production for stocks, i.e. it also includes production that is not sold.
One can use the Soviet type of output concept if one is interested in measuring productivity defined as the produced output per employee. However, producing huge quantities of unwanted goods can hardly be considered an economic way of using one's resources. Therefore, I prefer a productivity concept based on sales per employee.
Unfortunately, there is no Information available on the size of Soviet stocks, or the amount of production for stocks. This need not be a serious problem for the comparison in this study on the assumption that Soviet stocks can legitimately be valued at the same prices as the Output sold. For the moment it is not clear whether this is the case. 
Value Added Concept
For comparisons of productivity levels we are primarily interested in value added rather than in gross Output. The former excludes double counting of that part of output which is used as inputs in other enterprises or establishments. In general, value added can be derived by subtracting intermediate inputs from gross output. Value added in the US census is derived by subtracting the cost of materials, supplies, energy and contract work from the value of shipments and adjusting for net changes in stocks of fmished goods, raw materials, etc., the margin of goods merchandised or factored, and purchases of industrial services. This census value added concept differs from value added as reported in the US national accounts. The main difference between the two is the treatment of non-industrial services." To avoid double counting of inter-sectoral input use, the national accounts also deduct nonindustrial services from output. The census concept does not deduct those non-industrial inputs.® For estimating the benchmark comparisons in this study, I use the census value added concept. Time series are however from national accounts sources.
Soviet industrial statistics measure gross output and material inputs, but no value added. In my data-set, the information on material inputs is not complete. To estimate the share of material inputs in gross output I therefore used the detailed 1987 input-output table.® In the 1987 US Census of Manufactures purchases of non-industrial services™ are still included in value added. In the Soviet Union, non-material supplies are not measured separately, but it is not clear to what extent such expenses are accounted for in the figures for gross output and therefore included in value added. On the assumption that the value of non-material inputs is included in Soviet output, we obtain the best possible proxy by comparing the two value added concepts as described above.
EmploymetU Concept
For Soviet employment I used figures for industrial production personnel ('promyshlennoproizvodstvennyi personal') as provided by CIS-STAT. For a description of the sources see appendix A.2. The Soviet employment concept is defmed as: Industrial production personnel includes workers (refers to persons directly engaged in production of material valuables as well as in repair works, displacement of loads and rendering other material services), engineers and other technical workers, employees, apprentices, other personnel (junior services staff and guards) coimected with major production activities of industrial enterprises in main and auxiliary shops and engaged in management of enterprises (including supplies, marketing, and storage of finished goods and raw materials)." I deducted 6.2 million employees from the published figure for total industry (38.9 million," to exclude mining (2.0 million), repair and maintenance (3.1 million) and other non-
A.2 Sources
US Manufacturing Sources
The main source for US industry information was the US Census of Manufactures.'^ It gives very detailed product and industry information. Value of shipments, value added and the number of employees are given for about 450 industries, classified according to SIC (Standard Industrial Classification). The census of manufactures includes a General Summary which sununarises the information on industry level. For most products (some 10,000 products are reported) both values and sold quantities are given, so that unit values can be calculated.
Soviel Industry Sources
The information on Soviet industry is not assembled in a Single source. Data on production and employment were collected monthly by Goskomstat as part of the compulsory reporting Obligation of enterprises. Goskomstat collected these monthly reports and processed them, most of the information was only available for internal use. Goskomstat claims that for 1987 Üiere was a complete coverage of enterprises. The information thus gathered formed the basis for Gosplan, the Soviet plaiming agency, to compile and check the production plans.
Goskomstat made some of the results of this survey available to the general public in the Statistical yearbook Narodnoe Khozyaistvo and in more detailed publications like Promyshlennost' SSSR (Industry USSR). Unfortunately, these publications contain only summary information which was too limited for the present study. CIS-STAT compiled lists of industry and product information which we used as the basis for our productivity calculations from previously secret, internal publications. CIS-STAT kindly allowed me to crosscheck these lists with the original documents for accuracy and completeness.
The lists with industry information as provided by CIS-STAT show value of Output in Wholesale prices and the average number of employees for almost 400 industries. For a few industries the cost of materials is provided too. The industry Classification is according to OKONKh.
Product lists, provided by CIS-STAT as described above, show both unit values and Output values (in wholesale prices) for some 1300 products. Quantities produced are not given separately but were calculated from the given unit values and Output values. Products are not arranged according to the OKONKh Classification, but are grouped together by industry according to their similarity.
Soviet input-output table
Because of the incompleteness of information on material inputs in the Soviet industry statistics, as discussed above, I made use of the detailed 1987 input-output table for the Soviet Union to estimate value added. Note that the input-output table is compiled on an activity basis, so that estimates of value added using this kind of activity-based information will not be perfect.® An input-output table was compiled annually by Goskomstat on the basis of the compulsory monthly reports received from all enterprises, and normally consisted of 18 branches. In 1987, and every five years since the late 1950s, Goskomstat conducted a special survey of industry to compile a more detailed input-output table with 100 branches of industry. In previous times these tables were not niade available to the public, but, with the help of CIS-STAT, we were able to extract the necessary data from the detailed 1987 input-output table, which was used to estimate the share of material inputs to output, as described in appendix A.l. See the annex for the füll 1987 Soviet input-output table supplied by the US Bureau of the Census."
